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Abstract 
 
The participation of China’s civil society in the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake reconstruction featured 
a number of NGOs and social work organizations. Additionally, participatory development 
theories were broadly accepted and applied in their community efforts. However, our three-year 
field work effort in an earthquake-stricken village finds that those theories, based as they are on 
the presumption of alienated traditional communities, are being confronted with great challenges. 
Applying the extended case method, we claim that, quite contrary to a single and closed self-
recovery, community reconstruction is deeply embedded in and reshaped by a series of much 
broader social processes: state-dominated post-disaster reconstruction, urban-rural integration 
development, and social management measures. We further recognize three major forces 
constructing those social processes: neo-authoritarian local governments, victims with rising 
citizenship awareness, and community-based NGOs. Redefining the power structure in 
community reconstruction, we argue that, instead of the traditional bottom-up empowerment 
approach, in open communities pluralistic governance, through the collaboration of 
governments, residents, and NGOs, can work more effectively to empower communities and 
reach sustainable development. 
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        The recent decades have globally seen increasing concerns over environmental disasters. 
Historically, whether a civilization system could effectively manage large-scale disasters 
significantly impacted the vicissitude of the regime and even that of the civilization itself 
(Oliver-Smith 1996). In Chinese long history the central government had played a critical role in 
disaster relief besides victims’ self-reliance (Deng 1998). However, this tradition has changed in 
the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake as a large number of NGOs and social work organizations have 
been deeply involved in emergency relief and reconstruction.
1
 This new social phenomenon 
attracted much academic attention (for example, Deng 2011; Zhu, Wang and Hu 2009). 
        Mainly because of the impact of international development agencies, the discourse and 
approaches of participatory development have become dominant among China’s community 
development NGOs. Consequently, they have also been widely applied to NGOs’ practices in the 
reconstruction of quake-hit communities. According to this strategy, NGOs should advance the 
bottom-up participation of community residents in the reconstruction process, or in other words, 
“co-determination and power sharing throughout the...program cycle” (GTZ 1991:5, cited in 
Nelson and Wright 1995), and pursue the ultimate goal of the community-led sustainable 
development. However, is such a community development strategy really effective under the 
reconstruction situation? In particular, what variation does happen in the context of China's 
grassroots community? And what adaptation do NGOs make to deal with the variation of 
environment and develop their strategies suitable for local communities? Through our participant 
observation on the reconstruction process of a quake-hit village, in this article we attempt to 
answer these questions and make further reflections upon participatory development theories.  
       The classic participatory development theories were developed in the context of 
international aid and Third World development. They tend to assume that a community is 
underdeveloped if its residents do not become owner of the development agenda and if its culture 
and local knowledge are not fully respected. Therefore, the major approach is to “empower” 
residents, promote the bottom-up restructuring of the power structure, and ultimately reach 
community self-government and residents-led management (Chambers 1983). Criticizing market 
modernization theories and dependency theories, participatory theories propose to rely on 
residents’ participation as the essential momentum for community development. They emphasize 
that the community's own culture is a key driver of development and needs to be respected and 
promoted; also, the importance of supporting vulnerable groups is given high priority in the 
community agenda with the belief that real development can be reached only when marginalized 
people acquire confidence, esteem and ability for self-development. This requires empowerment. 
Furthermore, as the result of community development, everyone benefits and no one loses in this 
process (Yang 2007). 
        Globally promoted by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and a 
large number of international NGOs since the 1990s, the participatory community development 
theory and its corresponding technologies (with the Participatory Rural Appraisal at the center) 
have been widely applied in international aid projects.
2
 They proved to effectively improve the 
outcomes of those projects and advance the social-economic growth of developing countries 
(Zhou and Qin 2003). On the other hand, when the participatory theory came quickly to be 
regarded as orthodoxy in the field of community development, it also showed an “exclusionary, 
                                                            
1 According to our estimate, about 300 NGOs were engaged in emergency relief between May and August in 2008. Though some 
organizations withdrew from the stricken region after the conclusion of emergency aid, 200 of them stayed there and are 
participating in community reconstruction. 
2 The international development agencies’ impact on local NGOs is shown in Ma Qiusha, “Globalization, International 
Nongovernmental Organizations and the Growth of Chinese Civil Society,” Open Times 2 (2006): 119-138. 
Western Centric, inegalitarian” characteristic (Kapoor 2005, p.1204). However, with the 
expansion of economic globalization and the rise of newly industrialized countries, traditional 
communities are being deeply impacted by the free market and nation-state, and are connected to 
broad and complex social networks  far beyond their geographic limits. As a result, participatory 
development must adjust itself to cope with these environment changes. 
        In fact, given the basic changes in China’s community context, some fundamental 
assumptions on which traditional participatory theories are based have been questioned due to 
their significant limitations. These limitations include: (1) while participatory development 
typically deals with poverty-stricken, secluded traditional communities, community development 
is imagined as an isolated social process which is confined within the community (Kesby 2005); 
(2) community is often understood as a homogeneous, harmonious commune (Gujit and Shah 
1998; Mohan and Stokke 2000). As a result, the tension in the community power structure and 
the reproduction of power relationships are ignored in favor of the assumption that participation 
promoted by aid organizations will not cause a conflict within the existing power system (Crewe 
and Harrison 1998); and (3) classic participatory development theories also assume that 
community governance is relatively closed and independent of the state. As the state is usually 
too weak to intervene in community development, development agencies as partners and experts 
played a dominant role in agenda setting (Mosse 2005).  
        In this article, we examine these assumptions through our participatory research, and 
develop new understandings of community development. We use the extended case method 
(Burawoy 2009) to conduct this research. According to Burawoy (2009, p.21), this method 
“applies reflexive science in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the 
‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by 
building on the preexisting theory.” . Choosing this reflexive method stems from the need of 
producing local knowledge for NGOs’ participation in post-disaster community recovery. Since 
its introduction to China by international development institutions in the early 1990s, 
participatory development quickly became a dominant theory in community development and 
has been widely applied in disaster management by local NGOs after the Sichuan Earthquake. 
However, the change of social situations has brought a lot of predicaments and calls for theory 
adaption (for example, Guo 2010; Li 2009; Zhu 2005). Through the attempt of “dwelling in the 
theory” (Burawoy 2009: p.68) as action researchers, we try to reveal the interaction of actions 
and theories, extend it in the historic context, and develop theoretic adaptions.     
       In terms of data collecting, we mainly used participant observation. In July 2008, two 
months after the Sichuan Earthquake, we on behalf of a nonprofit institute and three other NGOs 
entered Baishuihe, a severely damaged community in Sichuan, and together launched an 
intervention initiative, the New Hometown Project, with the aim of assisting community 
recovery and development. The presence as NGO practitioners also provided great convenience 
for us to observe from inside the relationship and interplay of local governments, NGOs, victims, 
media, and the public, just as argued by Burawoy (2009: p.40) that “Interventions create 
perturbations that are not noise to be expurgated but music to be appreciated, transmitting the 
hidden secrets of the participants’ world.” Daily community notes since the beginning of the 
project recorded our observations on the entire process of community intervention and the 
interaction of stakeholders. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted both as a 
supplementary means to collect research data and as a project implementation technique to 
collect information for decision making. The subjects of interviews included all major 
stakeholders of our community actions, including project colleagues, community residents, 
government officials, volunteers, and NGO professionals from other organizations. Such 
interviews were conducted every half year and were coded by time sequence, by theme, and by 
interviewee type.  
        With three years of community-based research we find that classic participatory theories are 
still applicable to improve resident participation in community administration. On the other hand, 
with the advent of state-dominated reconstruction, accelerated urbanization, and social stability 
measures, the traditional community structure and development course are being deeply 
influenced and reconstructed by the state and market. As a result, sustainable development relies 
on power balancing and deliberate cooperation among different community stakeholders. 
Confronted with the political potency of the state and the economic power of the market, 
community residents and their organizations cannot act alone, but have to construct a strong third 
party by connecting themselves with NGOs, media and the public outside the community. We 
further argue that community can be substantially empowered only if such a third party besides 
the state and market is established to develop an open, plural power structure, reach good 
governance, and ultimately realize sustainable development.  
        Following the four-phase research method indicated by Burawoy (2009, p. 19-72), in the 
first section we describe our intervention and observation as action researchers in community 
reconstruction, especially through the New Hometown Project, a local post-disaster management 
initiative launched and managed by us. In the second section, we extend our community actions 
to the social processes of reconstruction in the entire earthquake-hit region, and discuss the 
impact of social, economic and political policies undertaken by the local government on 
community. The third section identifies three key players of community reconstruction, namely 
government, victims, and NGOs, and analyzes how such social forces influence the 
reconstruction process. As extension of theory, finally, we point out the limitations of classic 
participatory development theories and propose an alternative theory which proposes plural 
governance by fostering a strong third party besides the state and market.  
 
 
THE NEW HOMETOWN PROJECT 
 
        In May, 2008, the 8.0 magnitude Sichuan Earthquake broke out in Sichuan Province, China, 
and caused nearly 90,000 deaths. Over 40,000 communities were seriously destroyed. Two 
months later, we on behalf of an institute and three grassroots NGOs decided to participate in 
community reconstruction by launching a joint action called the New Hometown Project (NHP). 
We established a volunteer station in Baishuihe, a quake-stricken community about 30 
kilometers away from the epicenter. Our reconstruction efforts there have lasted three years and 
can be divided into the following three stages.  
 
Phase One: The Volunteer Station 
         
        Baishuihe is located in a small town 80 kilometers away from Chengdu, Sichuan Province’s 
capital, and is populated by 2000 registered residents. In the 1950s the government founded a 
state-owned mining firm in the town and recruited workers all around the country. In its peak 
days, the firm was staffed by 3,000 workers, whose families constituted the majority of the 
Baishuihe population. When the firm went bankrupt in 2002, all workers went out of work and 
fell in poverty. The elderly and children became the majority of residents when young and 
middle-aged people had to work outside the town. A deserted community, Baishuihe had no 
theatre, no gym, no museum, and no philanthropic organization to provide public services.  
        The earthquake ruined Baishuihe, killing 14 persons and destroying 95% of the houses. The 
drinking water system was severely damaged, and the power supply destroyed. Losing all of 
their possessions during the earthquake, residents lived in crowded tents and received limited 
food, clothes, and other everyday provisions from governmental allotments. Because of some 
past conflicts, however, there were significant tensions between Baishuihe and the township 
government. In particular, the management of the mining firm had played the role of self-
government for employees and their families and kept separate from the township government. 
When the firm went bankrupt, the government unwillingly took over the firm’s duties, which in 
turn caused discontent among laid-off  workers. Therefore, when our project was launched at 
Baishuihe, the township government expected us to help ease these tensions by assuaging 
resident disaffection. 
        Though much welcomed by the government, we set up some limits to our community 
actions in order to avoid political risks. First, we decided not to intervene in the dismantlement of 
damaged houses, the most important concern both for earthquake victims and government. 
Involving land ownership and housing right, this question was too complicated and risky for 
NGOs to address: NGOs might be regarded as the “black hand” behind residents and be expelled 
by government.3 Second, we focused on providing the public good rather than private assistance 
because of our limited resources and because of our value of whole community development. 
Moreover, we decided to cooperate with other NGOs and channel their resources to support 
Baishuihe’s relief and reconstruction. 
        At the very beginning, participatory approaches were used as the primary principle of our 
community actions. A three-month evaluation was conducted to identify victims’ needs and 
available resources. Then, they were invited to design the community reconstruction plan 
together. But generally, in this phase our volunteers played the role of public service provider. 
For example, considering that many children could not attend the school due to a temporary 
closure after the quake, the volunteer station opened some classes in painting, English, hand 
craft, and the like. A tent library was established and opened all day for kids, in which books 
were donated by other educational NGOs. We also built a tea house that was equipped with TVs 
and DVD players to entertain residents and help their psychological recovery. A great deal of 
relief materials were raised to help with victims’ daily life. It turned out that these efforts 
generated social space for residents’ interactions and effectively enhanced their trust for us.  
 
Phase Two: The Baishuihe Community Center 
 
        Five months after the earthquake, victims moved from tents to mobile houses built and 
allocated by government. Our volunteer station also moved with them. The emergency aid ended 
and quake-affected residents gradually recovered from the first shock and settled down. We 
adjusted our intervention strategy, shifting from volunteer-led public services to a new model 
where beneficiaries participate in service delivery and management. Based on the participatory 
development theory, we developed a community-led reconstruction plan that aimed to empower 
                                                            
3 This question involves China’s land system. There are two types of land ownership: collective and state-owned. Practically, 
government often maneuvered to transform the former into the latter by expropriating with a price much lower than the market 
price. Because of this ambiguity of the land ownership, government could acquire more power in the negotiation on displacement 
and reconstruction if they managed to dismantle damaged houses which were previously owned by victims.   
residents in improving their abilities and accesses to decision making in public affairs. This plan 
included: (1) Promoting public services and interactional space. According to residents’ needs, a 
community center was established and run by a joint work team of volunteers and residents. It 
consisted of the playground, training room, bathroom, tea house, library, and Internet café and 
soon became residents’ life center where they did exercises, reading, entertainment, making 
friends, and the like. (2) Advancing community organizations and volunteerism. We encouraged 
and funded residents to meet their needs in arts, culture and public administration by 
volunteering and establishing self-help groups. For example, when a growing number of 
residents began to volunteer in the community center, we transferred the center administration to 
resident representatives. Also, with our support, some residents spontaneously organized 
collective activities such as repairing the drainage system, reconstructing a pathway, establishing 
a dancing club, and so on. (3) Improving resident participation in decision making. We helped 
the community to launch an assembly which all residents were encouraged to attend and decide 
major public affairs in Baishuihe. Meanwhile, a special council which resident representatives, 
volunteer representatives, and community cadres would attend was established to conduct the 
assembly’s decisions and coordinate different stakeholders.  
        While residents’ self-serving and self-managing abilities were well developed, our 
volunteers’ job shifted from service delivery to giving advice on community agenda, mobilizing 
resources, organizing meetings, supervising finance management, and settling conflicts. Some 
social work trainees also joined our work team and enhanced our professionalism. 
 
Phase Three: The Centre for Social Work Development  
 
        Following the participatory development theory, we established a three-step community 
reconstruction strategy for Baishuihe: first NGO-led, then co-managed by local residents and us, 
and ultimately community-led. The given objective was to realize community autonomy so that 
we could hand over all public service work to residents and focused on encouraging and funding 
social service innovations initiated by residents, and advocating the residents committee to build 
democratic decision making procedures.
4
 Having partly succeeded in the first two steps, we 
began to experience difficulties on the way to the third one. 
        First of all, resident self-coordination was prone to a failure while without our presence. For 
example, we made a test during the 2009 Spring Festival: we asked all station volunteers to leave 
Baishuihe to enjoy holidays and transferred all remaining work to local residents. It turned out 
that, of all community center utilities, only the tea house was ran well and others ran irregularly 
or temporarily closed down.  
        Second, the principles of transparent decision making and transparent finance management, 
which we had always exemplified and advocated through our community efforts, were not 
substantially adopted by the Juweihui and township government. Their influence was merely 
confined to the community center in which we were directly involved. Moreover, when the 
national reconstruction policies were declared, local officials and Juweihui members 
significantly reduced their interests in participating in our community activities.  
                                                            
4 In China’s government system, there is an official governing body in every neighborhood or administrative village, called 
Juweihui (in urban areas) or Cunweihui (in rural areas), or simply “residents committee”.  Though elected by residents, the 
residents committee members mainly conduct governmental measures and report to the township government or neighborhood 
office. Therefore, a residents committee is generally regarded as a government agent at the community level. The election and 
administration of the residents committee can be referred to the 1990 Organic Law of the Urban Residents Committee and the 
2010 Organic Law of the Villagers Committee.     
        Furthermore, with victims’ gradual return to their everyday lifestyles and with the start of 
government-sponsored rebuilding projects, our volunteer station had become increasingly 
alienated to residents’ major concerned issues because of our role as “outsiders.” In May 2009, 
the township government started the housing rebuilding project. Losing everything during the 
earthquake, victims tried to get as many benefits as possible in terms of house rebuilding. They 
asked us to speak for their housing interests during their negotiation with the government. But 
we took a neutral by-stander stance in this issue after evaluating intervention risks: direct 
advocacy could reap nothing but a relationship breakup with the government and consequently 
lead to an immediate exile from Baishuihe. When residents found they could not get our support 
in terms of house rebuilding, their primary concern, they gradually reduced their interest in us. 
As a result, we soon found we could not effectively convene the assembly and council that had 
been regarded as the stepping stone for community self-government.  
        Another difficulty came from outside of Baishuihe. When the earthquake passed one year, 
the public’s attention and donations gradually declined. Few came to Baishuihe to volunteer. 
Furthermore, our four NGOs who had launched the work station also decreased commitment and 
support in this community and went back to our original tracks—volunteer training, basic 
education, nonprofit research, or environment.  
        All these obstacles made the third step of our strategy, a community-led development, 
almost impracticable. To adapt to the new environment, we adjusted this strategy in 2010. The 
primary objective was to endure the residential displacement period, a politically sensitive 
period, and extend our station to the rebuilt community in the near future. At that time we could 
help residents reconstruct public life and restore community organizations to pursue sustainable 
development.
5
 The new strategy included two aspects. On one hand, the workstation continued 
avoiding major conflicts between victims and government by taking a neutral stance concerning 
housing issues; on the other, we improved our work team’s capacity by recruiting and training 
local college graduates, promoting two promising volunteers to the project officer position, and 
recruiting more social work trainees to enhance our professionalism. Furthermore, with the local 
government’s assistance, we registered a local NGO, the Center for Social Work Development, 
which continued the volunteer station’s work and aimed to institutionalize our efforts in 
Baishuihe.  
        At present, we have made great progress in this direction. To help more people and build a 
broader community network, we established a new center in a nearby village. Residents still 
actively participated in the activities organized by us, but based on their personal interests other 
than the feeling of obligation, which they often showed in the past.
6
 The decision making 
systems that were established with our assistance still worked, though not as effective as before. 
Residents expected us to stay with them even after the displacement, and the township 
government also promised to continue their support. But even so, we were clearly aware of our 
limitations and realized that community reconstruction still had a long, rough way to go. 
 
 
THE MULTIPLE SOCIAL PROCESSES IN COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION 
                                                            
5 According to community reconstruction practices in other affected areas, it is certain that housing distribution will take the form 
of drawing lots at the greater community level. That means current neighborhoods and personal networks will be disintegrated 
and reconstructed, followed by a change of the public life pattern. The community reconstruction in the social-cultural sense will 
not start until then. 
6 In the early days when we arrived in Baisuihe, victims were very grateful for our concerns and assistance which they had never 
expected. As a result, they thought that they had the obligation to attend the activities we hosted in return for our help.   
         Disaster-stricken rural communities are often conceived as closed and isolated from the 
outside. But in fact, communities have been deeply influenced by multiple external forces during 
the reconstruction process. Targeted assistance partnership, urban-rural integration, and the 
introduction of the “modern community model” made the community anything but closed. As a 
result, Baishuihe’s reconstruction was not a closed, solitary process, but was exposed to an open 
social system and strongly impacted by multiple social processes, of which we as a volunteer 
organization were merely a trivial section. In this course, community-based NGOs and social 
work institutions would have to deal with not only victims but also other social forces which 
were involved in the community, too. 
 
The Community Reconstruction Movement 
        
        Since the phase of emergent relief the response to the Sichuan Earthquake was likened to a 
“war” by the state-owned media.7 This imagination of social fact constructed the basic 
characteristics of disaster management policies: centralized decision-making, intensive 
investment of aid resources, and the mindset of quickly resolving problems. Four months after 
the earthquake, the central government issued The Sichuan Earthquake Reconstruction Master 
Plan, officially launching the government-led reconstruction movement. Partly because of the 
demand of stimulating the economy after the 2008 global financial tsunami, the central 
government decided to invest ¥10 trillion in reconstruction issues. Furthermore, the Sichuan 
Provincial Government declared to compress the original three-year reconstruction plan to a two-
year one in early 2010. The campaign-like reconstruction profoundly impacted both victims and 
local governments in earthquake-hit regions.  
        Baishuihe was originally a community of plant workers, in which all apartments where 
people lived were owned by the state-owned plant. Before its 2002 bankruptcy, the plant 
management sold the apartments to workers for low prices. Except for their homestead land, 
residents had no other land.
8
 Therefore, housing rebuilding, which might lead to the loss of their 
homestead land, became their primary concern. They decided to spare no effort to preserve and 
increase their housing interests. Moreover, after the bankruptcy of the plant, about one fourth of 
worker families left Baishuihe and sold their apartments to some non-registered residents who 
had moved from other cities in recent years. This further complicated the property rights 
relationship between indigenous residents, new arrivals, and local government and made it quite 
hard to reach a unanimous agreement among different stakeholders. As a result, the government-
led movement-like reconstruction incurred a series of obstacles in Baishuihe. 
        Shortly after the earthquake, the government-contracted housing firm pulled down about 
half the earthquake-stricken houses in Baishuihe. On the smoothed land they built movable flats 
to domicile victims. Meanwhile, the central government announced a housing reconstruction 
policy that per urban household could get a house grant of ¥25,000.
9
  That policy also required 
                                                            
7 In reconstruction-concerned speeches by top leaders and news coverage, “war” has remained among the high frequency 
vocabulary. “An Unprecedented Relief War against the 5/12 Earthquake,” Liberation Army Daily, June 12, 2008. 
8 They could not purchase land to rebuild houses, either. This question involves China’s land law: any private land trading is 
banned since all land is either state-owned or collective-owned rather than private. When people purchase a house, they are 
granted only the use right of the homestead land. But the land ownership is still possessed by the government or collective. 
9 Though located in the countryside, Baishuihe was identified as an urban community by the government because most residents 
worked for state-owned firms. For rural residents, the grant was ¥ 16,000 - 22,000, depending on family size. However, with their 
wood land and homestead land, rural residents factually had more advantages in house rebuilding, for instance, to get logging 
local governments to provide financial assistance for victims so that they could move into new 
homes within three years. As the grant was merely equivalent to 1/3~1/5 of the total cost of a 
new house, residents decided to wait for more specific and perhaps favorable measures by the 
local government. On the other hand, reconstruction had become a political arena for local 
governments and officials: whether they met the deadline with high quality determined if they 
could be promoted or punished. In March 2009, the township government made a township 
reconstruction plan which involved all communities under its jurisdiction. Baishuihe residents 
were told that according to this plan, they would be displaced to a nearby idle beach to settle 
down and the current community land would be developed to build a farmer market. 
Determining the “tonggui tongjian (government-conducted reconstruction)” measure,10 the 
township government also made some prerequisites for access to new houses. 11 
        With the unilateral resettlement plan and relatively high housing prices, fear and distrust 
quickly spread among victims. Many people, especially the elderly, did not want to move out of 
their bungalows to the three-to-four-floor buildings which would not be equipped with elevators. 
Also, they thought that they should get new domiciles for free: their current housing land was 
close to the downtown area and had high market value. So, the government should provide new 
homes for free to make up for their land loss.  
        However, the government insisted on their proposed conditions. Officials urged Juweihui 
members and other cadres to take “ideological mobilization for the masses.” According to 
government arrangements, the Juweihui frequently visited residents from door to door and 
persuaded them to accept the conditions and sign agreement letters. An old woman described her 
experience: 
 
The Juweihui members and other cadres attended those governmental meetings 
on ideological mobilization. Sometimes when they came back, I asked what 
happened. They said, “I don’t know. I was just asked to persuade you to accept 
the government’s proposition, to fill out these forms, to give up your homestead 
land to save land (by constructing high buildings rather than bungalows).
12
 Your 
personal housing plan should give way to the governmental plan.”  
 
        Meanwhile, a rumor quickly spread in Baishuihe: “The Earthquake reconstruction is a two-
or-three-year thing while the central government pays great attention and concern. China is so 
big and the government has many things. No one will care about you later if you miss this 
opportunity (of being sponsored by government).” Considering that they had no money to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
permits or sell a part of the homestead land to government, which was locally allowed  by the government. 
10 According to the 2008 Sichuan Urban Housing Reconstruction Plan, housing reconstruction patterns for urban communities 
include “yuanzhi chongjian (victim-conducted non-dislocation reconstruction),” and “zaimin zijian (victim-conducted dislocation 
reconstruction),” “tonggu zijian (government-planned but victim-conducted reconstruction),” and “tonggui tongjian (government-
planned and -conducted reconstruction).” In detail, “tonggui tongjian” means that government plans, designs and organizes the 
building of affordable housing and low-rent housing. 
11 Frist, all residents who applied to “tonggui tongjian” must agree to transfer the central government grant of RMB 25,000 to the 
township government to pool funds. Second, each household needs to co-pay RMB 350 per square meter to the government if 
they want to get a 65 square meter apartment; if they want an 80 square meter apartment, they need to co-pay an extra amount of 
RMB 22,500 besides the first copayment.   
12 The application to join “tonggui tongjian” includes the following steps: (1) an applicant should apply to the central government 
housing reconstruction grant; (2) submit an application letter; (3) submit an agreement letter to give up original homestead; (4) 
fill out an application letter to transfer the central government housing reconstruction grant to the township government; (5) fill 
out an agreement letter to permit the dismantlement of earthquake-stricken endangered houses owned by the applicant; and (6) 
sign a copayment agreement letter. 
independently rebuild houses and that all community land had been “planned,” many victims 
finally relented to the great ideological and political pressure of the government and accepted 
their conditions.   
        When the second anniversary of the earthquake approached, the Longmen government 
officially started the first phase of the housing project with few residents’ support. But only 800 
units of apartments were built and unable to hold all eligible residents (about 1,500 households). 
On the other hand, residents refused any discriminative treatment in terms of moving priority. As 
a result, the government’s given objective of rehousing all victims within two years failed.   
        Because most victims in surrounding towns and rural areas had moved to their new houses, 
the Longmen government faced the pressure from the municipal government in terms of 
reconstruction progress and the criticism from local residents. It responded by continuing to 
persuade residents to participate in the “tonggui tongjian” plan, and told them that "If you do not 
apply to this plan before the deadline, you will miss it forever.” But so far, more than 40 
Baishuihe households still refused to join it. On the other hand, the government obviously saved 
enough houses in the second phase of its project to ensure that it would have the capacity to 
domicile all victims in the third year and to complete its reconstruction task. It was predictable 
that a new round of social conflicts and tensions would be rooted in the process of displacing 
“nail houses”13 and rationing new apartments.   
 
The Urban-Rural Integration Policy 
 
        Chengdu has launched its urban-rural integration plan since 2004. The core purpose of this 
regional development strategy was to accelerate the government-led urbanization with the “three 
concentratings” measure - concentrating manufacturers into industry parks, concentrating arable 
lands to modern farms (to replace small peasant economy), and concentrating (migrating) 
peasants to small cities or towns. In 2007, Chengdu became the “pilot city of urban-rural 
integrated development,” which further consolidated the dominant role of this strategy. 
       As an important policy basis for reconstruction and a development strategy in the long run, 
the urban-rural integration policy was rapidly advanced by taking advantage of the earthquake 
reconstruction.
14
 In this sense, though caused by an unexpected disaster, the reconstruction was 
integrated or even strategically maneuvered into the government’s social planning process. 15  
        The Longmen town has a population of 12,000 people, 76% of which are rural residents. 
According to the Penzhou municipal urban-rural integration master plan, Longmen received no 
special support from higher governments, though covered in this plan. With respect to its rich 
tourism resources (this town is located in a national park), the township government decided to 
promote tourism as its pillar industry and hence advance urbanization. In order to build hotels, 
shopping centers, and bus stations to support the tourism, an important step was to reconstruct 
the old downtown area which was established in the 1950s and thronged with damaged buildings 
and narrow streets. However, the government had faced a great challenge: Located in a relatively 
                                                            
13 A nail house is a Chinese neologism for the home whose owner refuses to make room for development.  
14 Pesident Hu Jintao visited Chengdu in December, 2012, and required local governments to “advance post-disaster 
reconstruction with the perspective of integrated urban-rural development (CURD).” Chengdu Municipal Government. 2008. 
“Combing Rural Housing Reconstruction and CURD policies.” Retrieved November 12, 2008 
(http://www.chengdu.gov.cn/wenjian/detail.jsp?id=tEcupahyqxXcRMUaHYFx&ClassID=07030202090102).  
15 A government-owned newspaper made a concise conclusion about CURD policies in Chengdu: “The significant characteristic 
of reconstruction in Chengdu lies in that it had a good foundation for CURD, applied CURD principles, reached the CURD goal, 
and promoted CURD practices.” “CURD and Post-quake Reconstruction in Chengdu,” People’s Daily on May 21st, 2009.  
isolated corner in Penzhou, Longmen was not a hotspot to attract private investors. This caused 
low land prices in the downtown. So, downtown residents were unwilling to move because they 
could not be compensated well. Their low unwillingness in turn increased potential investors’ 
hesitation. These difficulties had resulted in the failure of the downtown transformation plan 
before the earthquake.   
        However, the outbreak of the Sichuan Earthquake broke the deadlock. Within three months 
after the earthquake, construction firms hired by the township government pulled down about 
70% of the houses and public buildings in the downtown area with the reason of reducing safety 
risks and saving land to build removable apartments to shelter victims. Only some slightly 
damaged shops and houses were kept. Then, on razed buildings they built many mobile 
apartments, the ownership and allotment of which belonged to the government. With land 
consolidated, the original, physical limits between houses disappeared. It meant that the physical 
presence of residents’ houses, the primary obstacle to displace residents from the downtown, had 
been removed. 
        In March 2009, the Longman government developed its reconstruction plan with the 
primary goal of creating a tourist town. The downtown area, an essential part for this plan, would 
be reconstructed into a tourist service center. To resettle downtown residents, the government 
proposed to develop a state-owned idle shore on the rim of the downtown. Residents initially 
expressed their strong doubts about this idea and asked the government to compensate the loss of 
housing land replacement. For example, one resident said: 
 
The downtown area is the most worthwhile place in our town. If you want to 
displace us to that idle beach, you must compensate the value difference of both 
places, right? Isn’t the land in the Chunxi Avenue (Note: it is Chengdu’s center 
business district) more valuable than in other places, right?  
 
        The government strongly refused for following reasons. First, they could not make the 
compensation standard because the downtown has not yet received any private investment—so 
they could not evaluate its real market value. Second, they had already been in heavy debt 
because of the reconstruction project. If residents insisted on compensation, they had no choice 
but to stop the entire project. Furthermore, the township government made a close deadline that 
residents should sign an agreement letter to give up their use rights of the downtown land; 
otherwise they would have no access to new apartments that were being built by the government. 
        This negotiation was apparently unfavorable for victims. First, their houses had been razed: 
the loss of the physical presence of the houses also meant they lost their symbolic capital to 
defend housing rights. Second, after living in temporary shelter for two years, they longed to 
acquire permanent homes. Third, having been in poverty for many years because of 
unemployment, most residents could not afford to buy new houses from real estate developers. 
By comparison, the government-sponsored housing prices were relatively lower. Facing the 
undecided downtown area, most residents finally chose to accept the township government’s 
proposition. Therefore, the government finally reached their goal of displacing downtown 
residents through the post-earthquake rebuilding project. But given that some dilapidated 
buildings in the downtown still stood there and that the damaged tourist attractions needed years 
to recover, the downtown reconstruction plan remains uncertain. 
 
Social Management and Social Stability 
 
        Baishuihe was also embedded in social management reinforcement launched by government 
in the early 2000s. China has now reached the high incidence of social conflicts as a whole (Yu 
2009). In the Sichuan Earthquake-hit regions, social conflicts were much more prevalent and 
prominent both because of a number of controversies on the accountability of man-made losses 
during the earthquake and because of the problems of managing aid resources in the 
reconstruction process. Reinforcing social management to maintain social stability was given 
high priority for local governments.
16
  
        There had been three state-owned firms in Longmen. All of them either went bankrupt or 
moved out around 2000,
17
 with unemployed workers and their families staying there and mainly 
living in the downtown area. But the community management system established in the planned 
economy era left a number of problems. First, there were apparent institutional breaks between 
the township government and the state-owned enterprises in terms of public administration. For 
example, many people had their households registered outside of Longman when they worked 
for the state-owned firm.
18
 It was not a problem when the firm was responsible for their social 
security and welfare. But after the firm’s bankruptcy, the Longman government unwillingly took 
over the responsibility of taking care of laid-off workers from which they had expected to be 
exempt. The second problem was about laid-off workers’ social integration. Before its 
bankruptcy, the copper firm was affiliated with a national state-owned enterprise. In the planned 
economy era, the firm had long been politically superior to the Longman government, and 
workers were very proud of their political identities. However, when the firm went bankrupt, 
they became ordinary residents and fell in poverty. The sudden decline of social status made 
many people angry and depressed, which partly led to their tensions with the government. 
       In 2005, the Baishuihe Juweihui was established, aiming to assist the township government 
in term of the demographic and socio-economic census, public hygiene, social security, 
governmental policy dissemination, and so on. Embedded in the course of community transition 
(shifting from a “danwei”19 community to an administrative segment), the Juweihui found it hard 
to work: they had to face and address the multiple conflicts between the laid-off worker office
20
, 
township government, and residents. Shortly after the second election (in January 2008) of the 
Juweihui, the Earthquake broke out. To respond to victims’ diverse yet pressing needs and 
alleviate social conflicts, the township government greatly improved their support for the 
Juweihui. Accordingly, the Juweihui extended their functions to completing resident archives, 
investigating earthquake losses and victim needs, disseminating public policies, mobilizing 
residents, etc. It seemed more like a government-affiliated organization than ever before.  
       On the other hand, the government systematically strengthened the function of community 
organizations. In early 2010, in order to enhance its social management ability at the community 
level and support the urban-rural integration strategy, the Chengdu municipal government passed 
the Chengdu Community Council Guideline. This guideline directly led to the birth of the 
                                                            
16 Granted, on the other hand, social management was primarily a supplementary social process compared to the priority of 
reconstruction and that of the economic- growth-oriented urban and rural integration. 
17 The cooper company went bankrupt in 2002. In addition, a Baishuihe serpentine plant that was staffed by more than 1,000 
workers at its climax went out of business in 2000. The third enterprise, a machinery plant, moved out in the late 1990s. 
18 In China’s household system, the local government to which a citizen register household should be responsible for his or her 
social security and welfare. Once the household is registered, it is hard to change even when the citizen moves out of the area.  
19 The word “danwei (or work unit)” is an epithet for any official organization that was affiliated with the state in China’s planned 
economy era. Bjorklund (1986) explores its detailed meaning in China’s context.  
20 When the firm was bankrupt, the county government established a special office to deal with laid-off affairs. This office reports 
to the Pengzhou government that is subject to the Chengdu municipal government. 
Baishuihe Council. Though this council did not became a real community decision maker (The 
Juweihui was still in charge), it improved communication between residents and government.
21
 
        Furthermore, the government strengthened social stability measures especially in the quake-
hit communities. In March 2010, the Pengzhou government, to which the Longman government 
is subject, launched the “131+N” village-level government model22 and the “124” village-level 
social security model
23
. They both were employed as major moves to alleviate social conflicts 
and maintain social stability. When most quake-stricken areas began rebuilding and allocating 
new homes for victims, the contradictions between local governments and victims became more 
significant and frequent because of similar reasons in Baishuihe.
24
 To forestall mass incidents, 
since the spring of 2010 the Penzhou government had begun sending officials daily to every 
community (including Baishuihe) to make “on-the-spot-observation.” Appointed by various 
governmental departments, those officials were stationed in communities (one person per site) to 
observe whether there was an unstable social incident and directly report to the government.   
        In fact, often seen as an “unstable social factor,” NGOs experienced a “booming- ebbing-
rising again” process in the earthquake-hit places. The Earthquake aroused an unprecedented 
volunteering boom in China.
25
 Volunteers were often regarded by victims as the most important 
savior in addition to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the central government.
26
 
Therefore, when we arrived in the town two months after the major shock, local residents and the 
government had built high trust in volunteers and welcomed our help.   
        But the situation changed in August 2008. On one hand, after victims moved into the 
mobile housing, their dependence on volunteers for pressing necessities was gradually eased. On 
the other, for the sake of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the governments of all levels greatly 
enhanced their concern over domestic social instability in order to show the rest of the world an 
image of a great nation. In quake-hit regions, local governments began to clean up volunteer 
organizations, asking unregistered organizations to leave their territories.
27
 Mainly because of the 
government background of one of our partners, our volunteer station was saved. But government 
officials visited us weekly to keep track of our community services and the background of our 
volunteers. 
                                                            
21 In the past power structure, the community assembly had the supreme authority and the Juweihui or Cunweihui acted as the 
administration on behalf of the assembly. But in practice, the assembly was often dormant except for the community election 
period (the election takes place every three years), so the Juweihui or Cunweihui usually became the actual decision maker. In the 
new system, a small-scale but effective council is intended to replace the nominal assembly, consisting of resident representatives 
rather than all residents. The purpose of this new system was to have the council share the decision making power with the 
Juweihui or Cunweihui, establish a balanced power structure, and finally advance democracy at the community level. 
22 The “131+N” pattern denotes a village governance model in which “the village party committee takes leadership, three  types 
of community organizations (respectively the Juweihui, the council, and a board of supervisors) act as social agencies, the 
collective economic organization acts as a market agency,  and other types of villager organizations participate.” “The Pengzhou 
131 + N Pattern,” Chengdu Daily, November 25, 2009. 
23 According to an explanation by the Baishuihe party secretary, in the “124 Model,” “1” stands for “lingdao daiban” (a leader 
must work with the front-line staff), “2” for two visits (government leaders must visit every village in the district, and leaders of 
the villagers committee must visit every household), “4” for “four know-wells” (local government should know well community 
demography, know well disaster loss information, know well victims’ livelihood, and know well victims’ ideas about 
governmental measures concerning relief and reconstruction). 
24 An analysis of social conflict in the Earthquake-hit areas is shown in Hong Guo, “Social Problems in Sichuan Post-Earthquake 
Reconstruction.”  Retrieved June 10, 2010 (http: //www.ngocn.net/index.php?action-viewnews-itemid-79189-php-1).  
25 According to the white paper  “Disaster Reduction Initiatives in China” by the State Council Information Office on May 11, 
2009, about 3 million volunteers participated in the 5/12 Earthquake frontline relief work.   
26 During this huge earthquake, many local governments suffered a lot just like other victims and could not effectively deliver aid. 
In Longman, for instance, the government buildings were destroyed and some people were wounded.    
27 We observed that the number of active NGOs and independent volunteer organizations in Sichuan reduced from 300 to 50 or so 
one year after the outbreak of the earthquake. 
        After the Olympic Games, recognizing the significance of volunteerism for quake-affected 
communities, local governments began to develop government-affiliated volunteer organizations. 
Social work also became popular and welcome in the quake-hit areas.
28
  Benefiting from these 
changes, voluntary organizations and NGOs gradually recovered. In Longman, the government 
has acquired some experience of working with volunteers over years. Since 2006 it had joined 
the West China Volunteerism Plan 
29
 and another state-sponsored program which sent a college 
graduate to volunteer one year with the Juweihui (or Cunweihui) for every community. It also 
accepted two other NGOs to enter the town and undertake house rebuilding aids and youth 
development projects. Building more trust in us, now officials seldom visited us with the 
objective of observation. They even introduced us to other communities in hopes that we would 
extend our projects there. But generally, social stability remained an important concern when the 
government handled their relations with NGOs and community organizations. 
 
 
THREE RECONSTRUCTION ACTORS-- STATE, RESIDENTS, AND NGO 
 
        Three major actors can be seen in the multiple processes in Baishuihe’s reconstruction: the 
township government, residents, and NGO. The progress of the New Hometown Project in 
Baishuihe was constructed by the interplay of these forces.
30
 
 
Neo-Authoritarian Government: Planning and Marketization 
 
        In all three interwoven social processes, namely the post-earthquake reconstruction, urban-
rural integration, and social stability, the government played a dominant role. On the one hand, 
the government actively assumed its responsibilities in resettling victims, advancing economic 
growth, and preserving social security; on the other, it ruthlessly pursued the absolute control of 
public resources by keeping civil society organizations under control. Two important instruments 
were employed to undertake the neo-authoritarian policy: planning and marketization. 
        First, the government developed a set of quasi-legislative schemes on which its 
administrative power was firmly based. In the quake-hit regions, the governments of all levels 
made reconstruction schemes that involved the development of land and natural resources, layout 
of housing and public facilities, business and manufacturing, public service delivery, and 
establishment of government and community organizations.
31
 Also, there was a clear hierarchy 
                                                            
28 NGOs and social work organizations were differently treated in those areas. NGOs were usually regarded as the service 
provider with mixed social goals, or sometimes as the agents of democratization, and therefore were conditionally supported or 
even restricted. But social work organizations were seen as professional associations and could serve as a social control means to 
help alleviate conflicts and improve social welfare. Therefore, social work organizations received a lot of governmental support 
after the Earthquake.  
29 This program was established by the Communist Youth League of China in 1994 with the aim of providing talent support for 
West China’s development. Every year it recruits college graduates to volunteer at local governments in West China. 
30 Here it is an interesting question: Why did enterprises little impact community reconstruction in this stage even though 
government declared many attractive tax reduction measures? Within Longmen Township, only one village launched a joint 
venture with private investors that aimed to develop ecological tourism. Also, in the entire 5/12 affected region, only medium and 
large companies who were subsidized by government quickly recovered their production, but labor-intensive small and medium 
firms had difficulty in restoring from the strike. A reason is that small and medium firms depend more on well-developed 
infrastructure, a stable economic environment, and good local spending power. Facing severely destroyed basic facilities, 
residents’ significantly weakened buying power, and high uncertainty of local rebuilding plans, small and medium firms tended to 
choose to wait and see.  
31 These schemes and affiliated systems not only involved the economy but also social culture and political development. It 
of authority among them: A scheme of the lower government was made according to and subject 
to that of the higher government. In this sense, the reconstruction planning was also a process 
through which the power of basic resources allocation was reshuffled and centralized upward. 
Furthermore, though formulated by government, these schemes, according to a specific law, 
were given a quasi-law force.
32
 By formulating these plans, the government equipped their 
administrative behaviors with legislative force and asked people to obey. For example, when 
some residents asked to rebuild their houses on their downtown homestead land that would be 
developed for a business district according to the township scheme, the secretary of the township 
party committee answered:  
 
No, you cannot do that. The prerequisite of rebuilding houses is that you must 
observe the scheme, this is, the downtown area reconstruction scheme…As long 
as your project matches it, the government will never stop you. 
 
        On the other hand, though, as the supposed owners and beneficiaries of schemes, victims 
could not substantially participate in the scheme developing process. A law to direct planning 
behaviors, the Urban and Rural Planning Law regulates that the plan developed by the lower 
government be approved by its superior government. 
33
 Although a special ordinance
34
 required 
that “In the compilation of post-earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction planning, the 
relevant departments and experts shall be invited to participate and the opinion of disaster-
stricken people in disaster-stricken areas shall be fully heeded,” victims found themselves almost 
impossible to be heard. In most places, the only thing local governments did was to show their 
schemes in the form of huge-sized blueprints and put them up in front of their office buildings or 
along the main road as if they functioned to raise feedback.  
        In general, the government-led reconstruction was actually a large-scale state scheme.
35
 It 
aimed not only to meet the needs of a huge number of disaster victims to rebuild their lives and 
production but also to demonstrate the state capacity and promote the nation-state qualities. 
        The other instrument of the neo-authoritarian policy was the market. While the state 
realized its control of basic resources through planning, the market converted them into 
economic growth. Using the market as an important means to raise funds, the government came 
up with a principle: attract private investors and marketize reconstruction fundraising. In terms of 
policy practices, the government employed various market-oriented measures such as attracting 
private investors to help recover local economies, giving interest subsidies and tax reduction for 
enterprises, advancing the trading of construction land ration, and so forth. In some cases, the 
government even directly acted as market agents.  
        The rebuilding of the Longman downtown area was a typical government-driven market 
practice. According to an estimate by government, the direct house rebuilding cost (excluding 
land costs) of all 1,538 downtown households was about ¥160 million. There would still be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
demonstrated that as a state instrument, “scheme” is used for anything that the state thinks of as necessary to control. 
32 According to the 7th Article of the 2007 Urban and Rural Planning Law, “An urban and rural planning approved according to 
law shall be a basis for urban and rural construction and planning administration, and may not be altered without going through 
the legal procedure.” And the 9th Article reads, “All entities and individuals shall abide by urban and rural planning which have 
been legally approved and disclosed, be submitted to the administration of such planning.” 
33 See the 15th and 16th Article of the 2007 Urban and Rural Planning Law. 
34 See the 31st Article of the 2008 Ordinance on Post-Sichuan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.  
35 James Scott (2004) made an outstanding explanation about why the state prefers large-scale schemes. Though the 5/12 
Earthquake reconstruction planning is praised by many victims, it is still undecided what impact the planning will have on their 
lives in the future. Policy makers shall be alert to the challenge of negative impacts in large schemes as cited by Scott in his book. 
shortfall of ¥ 100 million for government to cover even if all residents had agreed to give up their 
house rebuilding grants and pay their copayments. The township government found a piece of 
wasteland on the rim of downtown that was state-owned and for free for the government.  On the 
other hand, the government asked builders to advance construction costs, and promised to repay 
the debt with the proceeds of downtown land transferring. The next step was to move all the 
residents to the new settlement, and use the saved downtown land to attract investors.  
        The government even took direct market interventions. For example, a document issued by 
the Chengdu government reads:  
 
The Municipal Economic Commission should lead the development of 
reconstruction schemes, coordinate the supply of steel, cement, brick, etc., and 
promote the direct sale of major building materials. The Municipal Construction 
Committee should guide and coordinate the recycling of construction wastes and 
the production of new types of construction materials. The Commodity Price 
Administration should take measures to regulate building materials prices, and 
keep them from going up.  
 
        By taking overall control over the factors of production and making them limitedly tradable, 
the state succeeded in combing two policy instruments of quite different attributes, planning and 
marketization, to both strengthen state power and stimulate economic growth. 
 
Victims: The Rise of Citizenship Awareness 
 
        When large numbers of people lost their most important assets – houses-- in the earthquake, 
the state acted as the primary rescuer to deliver relief and assistance. This caused a complicated 
feeling among victims, a mix of the collective state view and the market value. So, while 
maximizing economic benefits remained their primary decision-making principle, the citizenship 
awareness gradually arose in the multi-player game during the reconstruction process. 
        In the quake-stricken area, almost all the residential housing and ancillary properties were 
not insured for earthquake. On the other hand, although the state has the responsibility to provide 
aid, such responsibility was unclear for victims. So, the majority of victims responded by saying 
“ganxie guojia (thank the state)” while receiving releif materials. Some even expressed their 
gratitude by comparing the current regime with the “old society (Note: China before 1949),” 
though few people really had disaster experiences in that era.
36
  
        On the other hand, some residents thought that the state has the responsibility to help them 
rebuild homes. Their logic was that the state must take care of all reconstruction-concerned 
affairs because it is a socialist country. Otherwise they simply beseeched government to solve 
problems, just like what a victim representative said at a meeting with the township government. 
 
We please you to report our hardship to the government at the higher level and 
give our laid-off workers more subsidies. Our state-owned firm had gone 
bankrupt over years. How can we sustain ourselves? Now, we are required to pay 
an extra ¥ 20,000 to have new homes. We are poor and will have to borrow it 
                                                            
36 This expression was common especially among the elderly. But it is hard to distinguish if it is because they feel the difference 
from their personal experience in both societies, or merely because it is an expressive habit that was formed through many years 
of living in the planned economy and a regulated society.  
from the bank. We agree to have it as a debt (rather than a grant), but the debt 
requires payment in the future, right? We are so poor and don’t want to be in 
debt. You government declared that you would rehouse us and help us lead a 
happy life. But if you do not give us new houses, how can we live happy? 
 
        On the other hand, to maximize their benefits, victims actively resisted the government 
behaviors that might be unfavorable. For example, a dozen households in Baishuihe refused to 
join the “tonggui tongjian” project and brushed on their damaged houses warning slogans like 
“No moving my private property without asking.”37 Downtown residents demanded the right to 
share future land appreciation with government. These opinions demonstrated an apparent chasm 
between market value and collectivism, though both perhaps were raised by one individual.  
        A sharp conflict broke out when residents tried to protect their damaged houses and the 
government attempted to remove them.
38
 One night, to please a supervisor group that was sent 
from a higher level  government and would arrive at Longman the next week, the township 
government sent two forklifts to a street corner and intended to quietly tear down some 
unoccupied damaged houses. But, when the forklifts just began operating, neighboring residents 
found them and drove them away. The next day, some representatives elected and sent by 
residents came to the government and asked to negotiate with officials about how to finance the 
house rebuilding project. A representative said: 
 
Before the government and residents reach an agreement on house financing, the 
government cannot tear down those damaged houses. It may lead to 
“disharmony” (Note: it is a euphemism of resident protest) and do harm to both 
you and us. We think you should leave those houses intact. When the financial 
situation becomes better in the future, we please government to provide our laid-
off workers with more patronage. Then we can remove them based on an 
agreement by both sides.   
 
        As shown in this statement, residents accepted the government’s leadership in community 
reconstruction, and intended to show their weakness and submission in exchange for the 
expansion of their interests; meanwhile, residents clearly demanded their rights of information 
and negotiation. Although the talks did not produce a more favorable solution to residents, it 
forced the township government to publicly acknowledge that their behavior was inappropriate 
and to promise that they would never do that again. 
 
Active Yet Weak NGOs 
 
        Shortly after the Sichuan Earthquake’s outbreak, some NGO researchers had expected the 
                                                            
37 Two categories of residents often refused to join the government-controlled housing reconstruction plan. The first category was 
usually senior people who had no stable income to pay the discrepancy beyond the national housing grant and were afraid of new 
debts. The second was mainly residents who had two houses before the earthquake: They did not like to sell their homestead land 
to government with a low price, in hopes that the homestay land value would have a rapid increase in near future. 
38 Though these houses were destroyed and therefore lost instrumental value, they were still a strong symbol of property value as 
long as they existed physically, especially when housing ownership is often unclear in China’s legal practices. As a result, 
keeping the stricken house became critical to determine if victims could meet their demand of housing rights and became a key 
arena for government and victims. 
post-disaster reconstruction would greatly facilitate the growth of civil society in China.
39
 But 
after three years, it turned out that when NGOs moderately increased in number, the institutional 
dilemma they had long faced, namely registration hindrance, political pressure, public 
fundraising ban, human resources bottleneck, was not significantly improved. 
        Co-founded by four NGOs, the New Hometown Project was still a grassroots organization 
because of the founders’ limited capacity as shown in Table 1. These four NGOs had fund 
shortage in common. Therefore, the NHP began as a volunteer organization, which was staffed 
by volunteers and staff members from founder organizations. Since the NHP’s administrative 
budget was limited, in the beginning volunteers even did not receive any remunerations or 
allowances. The lack of full-time employees actually affected the stability of the work team and 
project quality.
40
 
 
Table 1. Four Founding NGOs of the New Hometown Project 
 
Organization Location Work area No. of 
staffers 
Registration  Annual 
budget 
Institute for 
Civil Society  
Guangzhou, 
Guangdong 
NGO research, 
training and 
policy advocacy 
8 Affiliated with 
a university 
¥1.3-1.7 
million   
Shoots & 
Roots Chengdu 
Chengdu, 
Sichuan 
Environmental 
education and 
youth 
development 
4 Private non-
enterprise 
¥250,000 
--40,000 
Wheatland 
Plan 
Chengdu, 
Sichuan 
Basic education 
and poor 
children 
1 Unregistered ¥100,000 
--20,000 
Yunnan 
Institute of 
Development 
Yuxi, 
Yunnan 
Development 
worker training 
4 Private non-
enterprise 
¥600,000 
--800,000 
 
        Another difficulty was the lack of an independent legal status. Not a legal person, the 
project might be declared as illegal and disbanded anytime by the local government. To insure 
NHP’s legal legitimacy, four NGOs signed an agreement to entrust all legal affairs to a Chengdu-
based partner, the Shoots & Roots Chengdu. But this manner complicated the decision making 
procedure by multiplying communication costs among partners. To solve this problem, another 
partner mobilized its social network in Pengzhou and registered the NHP as a private non-
enterprise.
41
 Later, we reorganized the management structure, established a council consisting of 
representatives from the founder NGOs, and formed a new work team staffed by fulltime 
employees, most of whom had previously been volunteers. These measures effectively improved 
                                                            
39 For example, Fang Xue and Bixia Xie, “The 5/12 Earthquake: Opportunities for NGOs,” Southern People Weekly June 2, 2008. 
40 This situation lasted one year. Since June, 2006, we had received overhead grants from a foundation and were able to hire two 
volunteer-turned employees. 
41 But in general, registration was still a great challenge for many NGOs. For example, another NGO based in Chengdu had 
played an important role in organizing volunteers and mobilizing relief materials in the emergent relief period and was awarded 
as “Chengdu Outstanding Voluntary Organization” by the Municipal Communist Youth League. Moreover, its founder was a 
cadre in a governmental agency. However, its registration application failed after two years of efforts because no government 
agency would like to bother to act as supervisor for this NGO. 
legitimacy and facilitated our fundraising efforts. 
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        However, political pressure, though somewhat invisible, has never been absent, and even 
made NGOs gradually accustomed to self-censorship. Shortly after we entered Baishuihe, we 
raised a principle that we avoid investigating construction quality incidents and earthquake 
casualties. These investigations would be regarded as politically sensitive and easily offend the 
local government. Another principle was to avoid intervening in the conflict between victims and 
the government, though it was allowable to help communicate in a harmless manner. For 
volunteers, the first article of the NHP Volunteer Code reads: “You are not allowed to have any 
form of illegal behavior, or engage in any political or religious activities, or make any political or 
religious comments on behalf of the NHP.” The purpose of avoiding politics was to make the 
government believe that we just provided voluntary services to help victims without any political 
intentions, and that we intended to help promote governmental efforts rather than make 
troubles.
43
  
        Our strategy seemed successful. To show their trust and support, government officials often 
attended community activities organized by the NHP and invited us to expand the workstation to 
other communities. In addition, this progressive development strategy was more easily accepted 
by the government and gradually influenced their behaviors.  
        On the other hand, however, the NHT paid the price of a decline in residents’ trust. A 
former employee commented: 
 
In the past, we did not face the tension between residents and the government. 
Residents were most concerned about their new houses. When we avoided this 
problem, or merely told them that we were unable to give help, they said they 
understood our situation. But when they had more complaints against government 
(and were going to protest), they excluded us from their plans.  
         
        Another loss for us was that we failed to take advantage of this critical time for community 
development (also a period full of conflicts) to help residents build new community governance 
mechanisms, which had been our core objective in Baishuihe. Again this case vividly 
demonstrates the dilemma between the restrictions of the political power structure and the 
participatory development approaches at NGOs. 
 
 
BEYOND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
        In the previous text, we expanded our community efforts to the main social processes in 
which our project and the targeted community were situated, and further explored the 
characteristics of three social forces that constructed those social processes, namely the state, 
citizens, and NGOs. It is clear that the approaches and effects of community development are the 
products of the social environment in which it is embedded, and the products of the interaction of 
different players in the space of community. In China’s current political and economic context, 
                                                            
42 Foundations usually hesitate to support unregistered NGOs, especially those engaged in politically sensitive areas such as 
human rights, democracy, advocacy, etc., to prevent exposure to political risks.  
43 The “trouble” denoted any activity that might strengthen victims’ dissatisfaction on governmental measures, bring media 
coverage of government deflects, or criticize public policies. Very often, trouble makers would be expelled out. But those who 
disseminated unfavorable political or religious thoughts would be punished more severely.   
the traditional participatory theories are confronted with a series of challenges when they are 
applied to the earthquake reconstruction.  
        First of all, the state assumes the dominant position in community while NGOs are very 
weak and marginalized. In the traditional context of participatory development, however, 
economic resources in fact became the basis of the community power structure. As they had 
strong economic power, development agencies often played a dominant role in the community 
and actually determined the allocation of community resources (even including those originally 
owned by residents). NGO workers as “development experts” led the community development 
agenda and demanded beneficiaries’ participation, “Participate! That’s an order!” (Blanchet 
2001, p639) 
        However, during the Baishuihe reconstruction, our project experienced a remarkable shift 
from the classic environment to a fully reverse situation. After the initial shock, local 
governments failed to respond to victims’ diverse, immediate requests because they also suffered 
significant losses and had not yet recovered. At that very moment NGOs and volunteer 
organizations played an important role in offering emergency aid in earthquake-hit communities.  
As the government-led reconstruction plan was launched, the state undertook massive 
investments to support the recovery of people’s livelihood and strengthen community security. 
Naturally, the state began to dominate the community agenda. The basis of state authority 
stemmed both from the state’s irreplaceable role in providing victims with comprehensive large-
scale assistance and from people’s recognition of the regime’s socialist characteristics.44 NGOs 
adjusted their strategies, emphasizing their roles as “a supplementary force for the government-
led reconstruction system” so as to “play a subordinate, accessory role.” In other words, when 
the traditional participatory development strategy broke down without the support of economic 
power, the state’s top-down planning and resource marketization became the new rules of thumb. 
        Second, the context of fragmented communities in rapid socioeconomic transition made 
impractical the traditional progressive empowerment approach. Participatory development often 
targeted poor traditional communities and assumed that they need progressive improvement. 
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According to this logic, development aid focused on improving the whole community and 
prevented marginalized groups from becoming more vulnerable. However, in our Baishuihe 
case, urbanization had highly differentiated its residents before the Earthquake. For example, 
nearly one fourth of the Baishuihe population was not local—following the arrival of seasonal 
residents in recent years. The earthquake further split the community through migration and 
displacement, discriminatory subsidies based on household registration, and resettlement. On the 
other hand, because of the tight top-down rebuilding agenda, the community experienced a rapid 
transformation, which made in-depth resident participation almost infeasible.   
        Third, the community was embedded in an open social system where many problems came 
from outside and could not be solved by the community itself. Traditional participatory theories 
often assumed that communities are isolated social islands, and that people have to take a 
bottom-up empowerment approach to change the power hierarchy and achieve people-led 
sustainable development. In development practices, however, the new community order, which 
was established through power struggles and with the support of development agencies, was 
usually unstable. In some cases it even caused the reinforcement of traditional authority and 
                                                            
44 Dingxin Zhao (2012) argues the legitimacy of a regime comes from three major sources, namely rule of law and election, 
ideology, and political achievement.    
45 Participatory development theories stemmed from research on poverty reduction in traditional communities. See Chambers 
(1983, 1994) and the World Bank (2001). 
deeper fragmentation among residents after aid providers left the community (Ferguson 1990). In 
contrast to their traditional counterparts, our earthquake-hit communities had become 
increasingly open and diverse. Many factors were responsible for this new situation, including 
the high incidence of cell phone and Internet use
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, diversification in employment and social 
networks, intervention by NGOs and volunteers, mass media, and the close attention of 
underlying private investors. As a result, though the government was still dominant in the power 
structure, the power sources had become diverse. Community governance was based on a multi-
player game played between different social forces, rather than merely being confined inside the 
community. 
        To address the new challenges of the post-disaster reconstruction situation, we contend that 
NGOs need not discard the concept of participatory development, but should go beyond its 
limitations by redefining community development from the perspective of social transformation. 
The primary feature of this approach is to advance pluralistic community governance based on a 
new community power structure. This structure requires the formation of a strong third party in 
addition to the state and market, by consolidating the community with NGOs, media, and the 
public.  The following are our suggestions for establishing pluralistic community governance. 
        First, develop deliberative governance. To respond to growing social conflicts and 
strengthen state legitimacy, the government has to place a high priority on building grassroots 
political power. The primary approach is to advance community economic and political 
development plans so as to enhance the state’s influence and control on communities. 
Recognizing the dominant position of the state in a community becomes a prerequisite for 
NGOs’ entry and invention efforts. However, the government-controlled community 
management has caused a lot of problems, and may ultimately undermine the community's 
capacity for self-development (Xu 2001). The deliberative governance approach offers an 
alternative in which the government acts as the work team leader, residents as members, and 
NGOs as facilitator.   
        In this alternative approach, NGOs play four roles. (a) Resident association facilitator. As 
most community organizations are not fully developed, they have difficulty in expressing 
collective opinions and organizing collective actions during negotiations with the government. 
NGOs can help their capacity building in terms of research, management and communicating 
skills. (b) Intermediary. NGOs can improve communications between government and 
community by means of taking surveys, organizing multilateral talks, and developing public 
events, so as to reduce misunderstanding and reach an accord. (c) Coordinator. Serving the 
overall interests of the community with a relatively neutral stance, NGOs can coordinate disputes 
among residents and prompt government and residents to work together and develop solutions. 
(d) Public goods provider. Aiming at the needs of the majority population, the government often 
fails to provide particular goods to help the minority. NGOs can make up for that flaw by 
providing supplementary support.   
        Second, fuse development interventions into the community’s everyday life. A typical 
community development project aims at its outputs rather than the impact. This project-based 
mode often brings about some myopic or even counterproductive effects (Guo 2010). However, 
the evolution of internal community institutions is a self-acquiring process, and is embedded in 
its everyday life. Therefore, community development must shed off the project-based mode and 
engage itself into residents’ everyday life. For example, NGO workers should work with 
residents to design and implement projects to ensure that these projects be practical, 
                                                            
46 In Baishuihe, nearly 100% of households have at least one cellphone and 10% use a computer and/or Internet. 
understandable and appropriate for the needs of residents; also, through living together with 
residents, development workers can breed a shared sense of community. When these workers 
stop acting as “development experts,” residents are more likely to develop their own identities as 
the subject of development plans and independently build their community agenda.  In turn, this 
strategy calls for fostering community-based organizations. 
        Third, improve the diversity of community power by strengthening the capacity of 
community organizations. The primary obstacle to participatory development is fundamentally 
caused by the weakness of civil society. To boost civil society, NGOs, community organizations, 
media, and other voluntary associations need collaborate with each other to form a third party. 
Only if such a strong third party comes into being, the community can develop an equal 
partnership with the government and market and make sustainable development possible.  
        But the third party need not be a unified entity: that is neither practical nor favorable. It is 
just the power of diverse social forces outside the state and market. As the community has been 
deeply involved in the open social system, the state is no longer the only source of community 
power. This creates the precondition for the community to establish a pluralistic power structure 
in which people organizations, NGOs, media, and public can participate and lay the foundation 
of pluralistic governance. Moreover, when community power becomes pluralistic, the political 
power that is usually monopolized by government is no longer the only element contested in the 
power field: Other elements such as economy, public services, and media also influence the 
community agenda. As a result, the pluralistic governance mitigates conflicts over political 
power and lead to a new approach to community development.  
        Fourth, foster civility and civic organizations. The disintegration of the danwei society since 
the 1980s has liberated Chinese people who were merely subject to work units or people’s 
communes, the basic units of the authoritarian state. As a result, the subjects with which 
development agencies deal in modern communities are no longer objectified, locally attached 
residents who live in closed traditional tribe-like places, but modern citizens whose identities are 
becoming public and subjective and go beyond geographic locality. Therefore, as pioneers of 
civil society, NGOs shall play the role in helping these communities further develop citizenship 
by advancing civil education, fostering volunteerism and civic engagement, and supporting 
voluntary associations. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
        Through a three-year participatory research project in an earthquake-stricken community in 
West China, we found that traditional participatory development theories are greatly challenged 
in the new environment of rapid community transformation. Different from their traditional 
counterparts, China’s modern communities are increasingly impacted by extensive state power, 
local marketization, and the rise of citizenship awareness. Though this situation seems 
unfavorable to the classical approach of participatory development, it will help prepare important 
preconditions for the growth of civil society. We conclude that Chinese NGOs should adapt to 
this new environment by advancing pluralistic community governance. That calls for the 
formation of a third party besides the state and market; or, in other words, civil society, by 
connecting people’s organizations, NGOs, media, and other voluntary associations. Only with a 
powerful civil society can we reengineer the social process of community development and 
fundamentally reconstruct communities.   
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